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Neuroimaging research has shown that
subjects in vegetative state (or unrespon-
sive wakefulness syndrome; VS/UWS) may
retain high-level aspects of brain activ-
ity across sensory modalities, language
and learning dynamics, emotions, or pain.
Brain responses vary in complexity, from
local activation of primary sensory cortices,
to the involvement of associative areas, to
activation of cortical–subcortical networks
to either mental imagery tasks or distinc-
tion of ambiguous/non-ambiguous words
or figures (1–3).
These observations document the capa-
bility of the severely damaged brain
to express surviving modular func-
tions despite impaired corticocortical and
cortico-subcortical connectivity and are
understood as indicative of retained, covert
cognition, or consciousness as opposed
to interpretations that markers of neural
activity not necessarily are surrogates
for conscious activity (1–4). The contro-
versy challenges our definitions of phe-
nomenal consciousness, and blurs the
extent to which the classical binary con-
scious/unconscious separation may serve.
The implications can entangle the cur-
rent diagnostic criteria as well as medical
care, legal or popular perception of bioeth-
ical issues, allocation of human resources
and logistics, and healthcare policies for
VS/UWS. The issue nevertheless is mainly
scientific and remains unsolved (2, 3).
The task- or stimulus-related brain acti-
vation in fMRI studies may or may not be
indicative of residual, covert consciousness
in VS/UWS (2), but neuroimaging research
on the disorder of consciousness is cer-
tainly seminal. In particular, it should be
emphasized how the surviving brain struc-
tures and networks identified in VS/UWS
compare as to anatomy and modes of
activation to those observed in healthy
subjects under comparable stimulus/task
conditions. This similarity indicates that
brain activation is not at random. It also
compels the evidence that the brain can
operate in sensory data processing or
motor action with limited or null con-
trol from conscious processes: where and
how, in the brain, sensory information pro-
cessing becomes conscious perception or
intentional planning becomes movement
remains undocumented (5). In VS/UWS,
interference on bottom-up processes from
top-down controlling brain systems is
peculiarly negligible due to the selective
disruption of the top-down projections
from high-order associative cortices (6);
modulation by attentional processes, spon-
taneous fluctuations in the brain func-
tional state (e.g., in vigilance), and inter-
action with the environment are conceiv-
ably also irrelevant. In a reversed per-
spective, the findings of neuroimaging
research (and the experimental approach
itself) would thus provide unique infor-
mation about unconscious brain mecha-
nisms or functions that in VS/UWS have
been investigated in experimental con-
ditions that happen to be ideally con-
trolled. This rationale should be dis-
cussed and submitted to a strict logical
interpretation in view of application in
research.
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